Today we know that the Great King was not a tyrant standing above the
law. His government also served the interests of the aristocracy and magi.
Moreover, together they were all bound by tradition and established
ideology to serve as the guardians of what was for Iranians the one and
only true religion.38
Another factor to consider was the great war of Xerxes I in the years
480-479, his occupation of mainland Greece and the destruction of
Athenian temples, which for centuries was considered to be the
quintessential act of eastern barbarity. Although defeated in the great 5th-
century wars, Persia had not ceased being a threat to Greek states in the
century that followed, though there were no more epic battles where Greek
hoplites had to defend the freedom of their poleis against many thousands
of barbarians driven on with whips as recorded by Herodotus. Aware of
the ineffectiveness of earlier military efforts, the Persians now changed
their policy. Intricate diplomacy and financial support distributed to
various Greek states in the last part of the Peloponnesian and during the
Corinthian War in the beginning of the 4th century let Persia to eventually
recover all its lost territories in Asia Minor. The empire also gained
control of numerous Greek islands in the Aegean, whereas the chaos of the
4th century allowed successive Persian rulers to continue influencing
events in mainland Greece through the skilful use of subsidies, diplomacy
and the threat of military intervention. No wonder that to Greek public
opinion Persia was the enemy par excellence. Even in 341 Demosthenes,
who was after all looking for Persian help against Philip II, had to assure
38 X., HG, 4.1.37 in Brownson’s translation (Loeb). Frye 1964, pp. 36-37; Barceló
1993, pp. 217-218; Hornblower 1994, pp. 54-56; Billows 1994, pp. 60-70; Carlier
1995, pp. 143-144; Briant 1996, pp. 350-351; Klinkott 2000.
The Heir to the Throne
63
the Athenians that the Macedonian monarch was an even greater threat
than the Great King.39
Many Greek physicians, artists and architects were employed in the
courts of the Great King and his satraps, whereas for good pay Greek
mercenaries served in Persian armies in their thousands. The best Greek
commanders fought in the many wars that took place in the western
regions of the vast Achaemenid empire in the 4th century including: King
Agesilaus of Sparta, Pammenes of Thebes, the Athenians Conon,
Iphicrates, Timotheos, Chabrias, Chares, Charidemus as well as the
brothers Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes. Yet Greek authors, particularly
Diodorus, who is our major source for this era, overstate the importance of
Greek generals and mercenaries in wars fought by Persia in the 4th century.
They concentrate exclusively on the role played by Greek soldiers on the
Persian pay. That is why many modern historians have succumbed to the
illusion of Persia’s military weakness against Alexander’s imminent
invasion and have willingly portrayed it as a colossus with feet of clay.
Looking at Alexander’s defeat of Persia with the benefit of hindsight it is
easy to forget that for most of the 4th-century before the Macedonian
conquest, despite internal problems, the Achaemenid state had generally
experienced political successes. Artaxerxes II recovered the Greek cities of
Asia Minor that had been lost in the 5th century. At the start of his reign
Artaxerxes III quelled the rebellion of the western satraps, next in 345 he
crushed the resistance of Phoenician cities before finally in 343 re-
conquering Egypt, which for 61 years had been independent of Persia. In
Asia Minor, which was much closer to Greece, tyrants attempting to gain
quasi-independence, such as Hermias of Atarneus, were removed. The
Great King’s authority over the satraps was once again restored and, after
ending his military actions, Artaxerxes III ordered them to disband their
mercenary armies, so as they would no longer be able to act too
independently. The reign of Artaxerxes IV (338-336) was too short-lived
to allow us to assess it. On the other hand, his successor, Darius III, will
because he had the misfortune of facing in battle the greatest military
leader of ancient times – Alexander the Great. However, when Darius
ascended the throne he was already a known figure. Under Artaxerxes III
he had acquired fame as a warrior. Moreover, the fact that he had managed
to take over the throne and dispose of Bagoas without causing political
unrest indicates that he must have acquired the trust of the Iranian
aristocracy and magi. We also know that at the start of his reign he briskly
39 D., 10.33.4. Badian 1985, p. 427; Hammond 1994, p. 165; Tuplin 1996, pp. 153-
154; Flower 2000, p. 104.
64
Chapter II
quelled Khababash’s rebellion in Egypt thus once again restoring peace to
the Persian Empire.40
In 4th-century Greek literature there is a strong tendency to contrast the
manliness and triumphant valour of the Greeks with Persian effeminacy
induced by excessive luxury. To a certain extent this was a continuation of
a theme that had already appeared in the work of Herodotus, whilst at the
same time it also reflected the popular views of the school of Hippocrates
which noted how climate and living conditions affected human character
and behaviour. Ctesias’ gossipy and sensationalistic Persica provided
colourful examples to support such theories. According to the most
important political writers of 4th-century Greece – Plato, Aristotle,
Isocrates and Theopompus – the Persians were typical barbarians
degenerated by luxury, gluttony and sex. They were regarded to have the
mentality of slaves, whose behaviour betrayed a mixture of cowardice,
servility, arrogance and pride. These views were expressed most
effectively by the writer, soldier and philosopher Xenophon. His most
famous work, Anabasis, relates the story of Greek mercenaries (including
Xenophon himself) who, serving the pretender to the Persian throne Cyrus
the Younger, venture as far as Babylon and then after Cyrus’s death fight
repeated battles against the Persians until they reach Greek settlements on
the Black Sea coast. On the other hand, in his Hellenica the same author
glorifies the Spartan king Agesilaus and his struggle for the freedom of
Greek cities in Asia Minor. Xenophon contrasts hard, athletic, seasoned
Greek fighters with feeble and unmanly Persians: ‘And again, believing
that to feel contempt for one's enemies infuses a certain courage for the
fight, Agesilaus gave orders to his heralds that the barbarians who were
captured by the Greek raiding parties should be exposed for sale naked.
Thus the soldiers, seeing that these men were white-skinned because they
never were without their clothing, and soft and unused to toil because they
always rode in carriages, came to the conclusion that the war with them
would be in no way different from having to fight with women.’41
These well written and popular boo
ks as well as the works of other
anti-Persian authors, particularly Ephorus of Cyme – author of the first
Greek universal history, which was later used as a source by Diodorus,
Strabo, Plutarch and Pompeius Trogus – give the impression that the
40 Parke 1933, pp. 105-112, 122-132, 165-169; Starr 1976, pp. 63-66; Ruzicka
1993, pp. 85-91; Hornblower 1994, pp. 45-48; Burstein 2000; Brosius 2003, pp.
170-171. One new book (Briant 2003) is largely devoted to the image of Darius III
in historiographic tradition.
41 H., HG, 3.4.19 in Brownson’s translation (Loeb). Momigliano 1975, pp. 129-
137; Starr 1976, pp. 50-60; Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 80-85; Tuplin 1996, pp. 153-162.
The Heir to the Throne
65
Persian Empire was weak and the only forces of value were the Greek
mercenaries. Xenophon relates what Antiochus of Arcadia, a envoy to the
Persian court, said: ‘the King had bakers, and cooks, and wine-pourers,
and door-keepers in vast numbers, but as for men who could fight with
Greeks, he said that though he sought diligently he could not see any.’
Nonetheless such views cannot be regarded as reflecting the true state of
affairs but merely the Hellenocentric outlook of the authors, who regarded
the polis to be the universal model for a proper state and a state’s military
power to be measured by its ability to deploy a citizens’ army of hoplites.
Yet the basic Persian military formation was the Iranian cavalry, whereas
Greek mercenaries were only hired in the western part of the empire.
Despite the large numbers of mercenaries employed, as many as 20,000
soldiers in the 340s, they never formed independent armies realising Greek
political aims. Instead they were merely a part of the Persian army,
following the orders of the Great King and his satraps. These mercenaries
were commanded by Persian or Greek officers, in return for whose loyal
service the king would frequently grant them land and gradually
incorporate them into the ruling aristocracy. Naturally the lack of a native
infantry was a potential source of danger to the state, but only in the
eventuality of the Great King no longer being able to recruit Greek
mercenaries. As long as the market for mercenaries remained open, the
recruitment of Greeks was not a sign of any weakness or decline but of
Persian appreciation of the difference between Greek and Asian infantry.
In antiquity infantry soldiers were drafted from the peasantry and those in
the Asian part of the Persian Empire were too poor to be able to afford
hoplite armour, they lacked the social models of how to behave like
phalangites and, besides, serfs never made good recruitment material for
such military formations. Therefore, on account of Persia’s social structure,
the Great King could not use his Asian subjects to form large efficient
infantry units and thus the drafting of Greek mercenaries was the simplest
alternative. The only Persian infantry formation of military value, though
also inferior to the Greek hoplites, was what the ancient authors call the
‘immortal’ guard. The name itself is actually yet another example of how
little the ancient Greeks understood Persia. The Persian name for the guard
was anušiya meaning servants or companions, whereas the Greeks
confused the name with another Persian word anuša, which indeed means
immortals. Thanks to the skilful use of Greek mercenaries, Iranian cavalry
and a fleet provided by Greek and Phoenician cities, the rulers of Persia
were for a long time able to successfully realise their foreign policy.42
42 X., HG, 7.1.38, after Brownson (Loeb). See also Plb., 3.6.9-12 for the importance
of Xenophon’s picture of Persia’s weakness. Hornblower 1994, pp. 80-83, 92;
66
Chapter II
This fact, even though it was painfully felt by the Greeks, especially
those living in Asia Minor, had no effect on the popularly held myth of
contemptible Persian military ineptitude and low morale. The 4th-century
Persian victories over the Greeks were explained simply by the lack of
unity among Greek states. It is worth noting that in the 4th century,
especially after 386 when the Persians regained full and, as it seemed,
permanent control of Greek cities in Asia Minor, Greek political authors
began treating compatriots living in that region as one political entity and
it was then that calls for their liberation first appeared. Some scholars
assume that many of the contemptuous opinions about Persians were
inspired by Greeks living in Asia Minor, who were hoping for a new
Greco-Persian war that would free them from the Great King. By
emphasising the structural weakness of the Achaemenid Empire they
wished to facilitate the decision of mainland Greeks to invade. Plutarch
even names an associate of Plato, Delios of Ephesus, who was apparently
sent as an envoy from Asia Minor to Alexander to persuade him to invade
Persia and liberate the Greeks there.43 Unfortunately we do not know
Plutarch’s source.
The main theme in Greek political literature after the Peloponnesian
War concerned a lack of political stability and constant conflicts, which no
doubt reflected the mood among the Greek public. The remedy advocated
by writers and orators was to unite the conflicting poleis with a common
cause. It was at the start of the 4th century that the idea of Panhellenism
first appeared in speeches given by the famous sophist Gorgias of Leontini
and the Athenian rhetorician Lysias. This concept stressed that, despite
their various differences, the Greeks had much more in common with each
other than with barbarians. The most influential 4th-century propagator of
Panhellenism was Isocrates. After years of unsuccessfully searching for a
polis capable of uniting the Greeks, in 346 Isocrates decided that Philip II
was the best suited ruler to become hegemon and tried to persuade Greek
public opinion that this was the case. According to a plan that Isocrates
had formulated most fully in several works ( Panegyricus, Philippus and
letters he wrote to Philip II), the union of Greek states was to be built on a
common cause to fight their arch enemy Persia. One of the things the
Athenian author could not bear was the fact that, unlike his Greek
compatriots, the barbarians in Asia were living in prosperity and their
Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 90-92, Briant 1996, pp. 803-809. About mercenaries in
general see now: Trundle 2004.
43 Seager, Tuplin 1980; Flower 1994, p. 89; Hornblower 1994, p. 211. The
embassy of Delios: Plu., mor. , 1126d; see Brunt 1993, p. 291; Flower 1994, p.107;
Ruzicka 1997, pp. 124-125.
The Heir to the Throne
67
economy was thriving. One could say that this conflicted with his sense of
justice. Isocrates was not alone among the Greeks in thinking that they
were created by nature to rule over barbarians like the Persians.
Experiences of the great Persian wars in the 5th century served as evidence
that by diverting its energies away from internal conflicts to overseas
expansion a united Greece would ultimately defeat Persia. For Isocrates
the key issue w
as to remedy Greek demographic and social problems
without starting a revolution involving the redistribution of land and other
actions that could harm the rich. Through the large-scale colonisation of
conquered land in Asia, war with Persia was to be a painless way of
alleviating Greece’s social tensions. Philip would be rewarded with wealth
and fame as well as esteem among the Greek peoples. In keeping with the
Greek literary tradition, Isocrates enhanced his arguments with references
to mythology, which in J. Burchkhardt’s words, was the ideal basis of
Greek existence. Isocrates argued that as the descendent of Heracles Philip
was bound to conquer Asia and there found new cities. Finally it should be
stressed that in Antiquity there was nothing unethical in conquering other
countries for, quite unlike today, war was seen as a natural state of affairs,
though of course prolonged conflicts were not considered a good thing.44
Although Isocrates’s views are well known, the extent to which he and
other Panhellenists influenced the decisions made by Philip II and later by
Alexander remains highly controversial. Indeed, Isocrates does not overtly
claim that Philip’s decision to invade Persia was made on his persuasion.
The only fairly certain thing is that both the Greek elites and the general
Greek public feared and disliked Persia. The Greek elites were people the
Argead kings were very much in touch with and whose acceptance they on
more than one occasion were eager to gain. Moreover, among the
proponents of war with Persia were Aristotle and Callisthenes, who were
very close to Philip and Alexander. The fact that Persia was indeed
perceived as the arch enemy of Greece should lead us to rejecting the
opinion that the Panhellenic idea of invading Persia was just a propaganda
ploy or a mere marketing tool used by Isocrates to draw the attention of
potential clients, especially Philip II, to his school. Sanctioned by the
League of Corinth, Philip’s declaration of war against Persia had two
official goals: to liberate the Greeks in Asia Minor and to avenge crimes
committed by the Persians 150 years earlier, particularly the destruction of