and survived. A thousand Athenians lay dead on the battlefield as did a
similar number of Boeotians and considerable numbers of other Greek
allies who had fought in the centre, especially the Achaeans. The
Macedonians captured 2,000 Athenians and many other Greeks.18
The annihilation of the Sacred Band symbolically marked the end of
hoplite dominance on the battlefield as indeed the political dominance of
the type of state they defended – the powerful Greek polis. From the
purely military point of view, Chaeronea marked a turning point in the
history of Western warfare in that for the first time a battle was essentially
won by the cavalry. Here the infantry secured a large part of the front line
thus allowing for a horseback riders’ offensive. This was also probably the
first time the Macedonian cavalry fought using sarissae, which were so
effective against the Boeotian infantry. At Chaeronea the infantry was
deployed to hold the front line against a greater number of enemy troops
and then the decisive blow was delivered with a heavy cavalry charge.
This would become Alexander’s favourite tactic with which at the head of
his charging companion cavalry he carried off successive victories against
the Persians. To his father’s joy, the outstanding role in the fighting played
by the heir to the throne made the Macedonians hail Alexander as their
king, whereas Philip remained their military leader.19
After the battle Philip treated each of his chief vanquished enemies
very differently. With Macedonian troops now able to access all parts of
Boeotia, the king had his erstwhile allies, the Thebans, completely at his
mercy and punished them very harshly. They not only had to pay ransoms
for hostages but also for the privilege of burying their fallen soldiers. A
Macedonian garrison was now installed in the Theban citadel of Cadmea.
Anti-Macedonian politicians were either executed or exiled, whereas 300
previously exiled supporters of Philip were now allowed to return. On top
of this, the Boeotian cities that the Thebans had destroyed were now
rebuilt, which greatly weakened the position of Thebes in the Boeotian
League. Philip’s harsh treatment of the Thebans may have resulted not
only from the correct assumption that this polis was the linchpin of Greek
18 Diod., 16.85.5-86; Plu., Alex. , 9.2-3; Plu., Cam. , 19.9; Polyaen., 4.2.2, 4.2.7; Fron., Str. , 2.19; Paus., 7.6.5, 9.40.10 ; Str., 9.2.37 ; Just., 9.3. Cawkwell 1978, pp.
144-149; Griffith 1979, pp. 596-603; Hammond 1994, pp. 148-154; Carlier 1996, p.
111; Ashley 1998, pp. 154-157; Hamilton 1999, p. 23.
19 Plu., Alex. , 9.4; Plu., Pel., 18.5. Borza 1990, p. 225; DeVoto 1992, pp. 17-19; Sabin 2007, pp. 127-128.
52
Chapter II
resistance against Macedonia but also because of its traditionally strong
ties with Persia. The Thebans had not only backed the Persian side during
the Greco-Persian wars at the start of the 5th century but also in more
recent times when they helped Artaxerxes III in quashing the satrap revolts
in Asia Minor and in his conquest of Egypt in the years 343-341. The
Theban stance could not have gone unnoticed by Philip, who was already
planning war with Persia at the time. Other Greek states were also
punished. Macedonian garrisons were installed in Corinth, Ambracia and
Chalcis, thus placing strategic routes into the Peloponnesus and Euboea as
well as northwestern Greece under Macedonian control.20
After Chaeronea everyone in Athens was expecting the Macedonians
to launch a direct attack. In what now seemed to be an unavoidable
situation, extraordinary military and political measures were resorted to.
The strategos Lysicles was made a scapegoat for the defeat at Chaeronea,
while political leadership was held firmly in the hands of the war party
headed by Demosthenes, Hypereides and Lycurgus. The Attic populace
were evacuated into the city, whose walls underwent repairs and were next
manned with soldiers. The Athenians took in anti-Macedonian refugees.
For the sake of increasing army numbers, unconstitutional steps were even
considered such as actually granting citizenship rights to the metoikoi and
liberating those slaves who were able to fight. Athens could afford to resist
flow of provisions into the city. But the showdown never materialised.
Instead the victorious Macedonian king released from captivity
Demosthenes’s political opponent Demades, which was a clear signal that
he was willing to start peace negotiations. Captured Athenians were set
free without a ransom, whereas the remains of those who had fallen were
delivered to Athens by a delegation of the highest ranking Macedonian
officials including Alcimachus, Philip’s closest companion Antipater and
the heir to the throne Alexander. With the emerging possibility of finding
a peaceful end to a war that had already been lost the mood in Athens
changed. Negotiations were entrusted to pro-Macedonian or rather just
anti-war politicians Aeschines, Phocion and Demades. There were prices
to be paid by the Athenians for peace, the heaviest of which was the loss
of Thracian Chersonese and thus also control of the Black Sea grain
import route. Other territory, however, remained in the hands of the
Athenians. It was also probably then that Philip ‘magnanimously’ granted
the Athenians the Oropus region, which had been disputed with Boeotia
20 Cawkwell 1978, pp. 167-168; Corvisier 2002, p. 255; Zahrnt 2009, pp. 19-20.
The Heir to the Throne
53
and was now ceded to Athens no doubt in order to enflame anew an almost
forgotten disagreement between Athens and her Chaeronean allies.21
Philip’s conditions for ending the war with Athens were milder than
had been expected. The Athenians expressed their gratitude by granting,
probably on motion of Demades, the Macedonian dignitaries appropriate
awards. Athenian citizenship was bestowed on Alcimachus, Antipater,
Philip and therefore in a way also automatically on his son and heir
Alexander. Moreover, a statue of Philip was erected in the Agora, whereas
Alcimachus and Antipater were also awarded the honorary title of
proxenos. The Macedonian king’s very moderate treatment of Athens after
the Battle of Chaeronea is usually put down to political motives. Philip
was planning war against Persia and therefore could not afford to prolong
the conflict in Greece; besides, the Athenian fleet of an estimated 350
warships could be of considerable use to him. Besides, plundering of
Attica, once occupied by Xerxes, would weaken Philip’ Panhellenic cause
in the planned war with Persia. There are also opinions that the
determination and energy the Athenians had shown in preparing for the
continuation of war inclined the Macedonians to conversely seek a
peaceful solution. However, we may also assume that for the parvenu
Macedonian laying siege to and eventually destroying Athens – in the
words of Thucydides, the school of Hellas – was contrary to what
throughout his life he had striven for, full acceptance in the
Greek world.22
3. The congress at Corinth and the beginning
of the Persian war
From the battlefield of Chaeronea the Macedonian army marched to the
Peloponnesus and there accepted the capitulations of the poleis that had
sided with Thebes and Athens. The army also conducted a punitive raid
into Laconia as a result of which Sparta lost border territories to
Macedonia’s allies – Argos, Messenia and the Arcadian states. Sparta was
thus weakened, but Philip did not punish it further, no doubt because he
21 Griffith 1979, pp. 604-609; Hammond 1994, pp. 155-157; Habicht 1999, pp. 11-
12; Brun 2000, p. 65; Corvisier 2002, p. 256. On the date of transfer of Oropus to
Athenian control (338 or 335) see Faraguna 2003, p. 100.
22 Hyp., Philippides, fr. 8; Hyp., ap. Harp., s.v. Alk∂macoj; IG ii2 239; Plu., Dem. , 22; Paus., 1.9.4; Scholia in Aristid., Panathenaikos, 178.16; Just., 9.4.5. Cawkwell
1978; p. 167; Cawkwell 1996, pp. 98-99; Osborne 1983, pp. 69-70 (T69); Griffith
1979, pp. 619-620; O’Brien 1992, p. 26; Whitehead 2000, p. 41; Badian 2000, pp.
54-55; Brun 2000, pp. 64-65; Hammond 1994, p. 157; Carlier 1996, p. 116;
Corvisier 2002, p. 256 ; Worthington 2008, pp. 155-156.
54
Chapter II
wished to use it as a counterbalance: fear of the region’s former ruling
power seeking to exact revenge would in the future naturally incline the
other Peloponnesian states to maintain their alliance with Macedonia. Thus
two major land powers of Greece, Thebes and Sparta, were weakened and
kept in check by their neighbours.23 In the autumn of 338 Philip sent an
invitation to all the Greek states, described by many as more like a veiled
order, to attend a meeting which was to be held at Corinth the following
spring. The choice of Corinth was not made by chance. It was there that in
480 the majority of states in continental Greece formed a symmachia
(alliance) which victoriously opposed the great army of Xerxes I. More
recently, in 344, the Corinthians sent the famous general Timoleon to
overthrow the Carthaginian tyranny in Sicily and victoriously fight for
freedom of the Greeks in the West. The historic symbolism of Corinth
destined it to become the place where yet another initiative was made to
unite the Greeks in a common cause.24
Alexander in all probability did not accompany his father in the
Peloponnesian campaign but instead, after his mission to Athens, he was
sent back to Macedonia. There are some scant references in our sources
that at the time there was trouble on Macedonia’s northern border. It must
have been then that Alexander engaged in the short and victorious war
against the Illyrians which is mentioned by Curtius Rufus in his
description of events that happened much later.25 However, we know of no
other details about this war.
With the exception of Sparta, all the poleis of mainland Greece as well
as some of the island states, such as Chios and Eresus on Lesbos, accepted
Philip’s invitation. During two sessions in 337 they accepted a resolution
ratifying a new state of affairs in Greece. We know it thanks to an
inscription found in Athens containing an extensive extract of the oaths
made by the Greek states in their treaty with Philip. The signatories were
obliged to: remain at peace and not to wage wars on other member states;
not to occupy their cities, forts or ports; not to oppose Philip’s rule or that
of his successor (i.e. Alexander); not to interfere in the internal affairs of
any other state and to oppose anyone who breached the treaty as specified
by the synedrion (council) and ordered by the hegemon of the league, who
was naturally the king of Macedonia. If, as modern historians believe, the
charter drawn up by Antigonus Monophthalmus and Demetrius Poliorcetes
in 302 repeats the resolutions made in 337, then at Corinth some other
23 Ryder 1965, pp. 150-162 ; Hammond 1994, pp. 157-158; Ashley 1998, pp. 159-
160; Corvisier 2002, pp. 258-259; Faraguna 2003, p. 101; Zahrnt 2009, p. 20.
24 Lane Fox 1973, p. 93; Flower 2000, p. 98.
25 Curt., 8.1.25. Heckel 1979, p. 390.
The Heir to the Throne
55
important decisions were made to guarantee a conservative social peace,
namely, a ban on expelling citizens against current laws as well as a
rejection of the traditional lower class demands such as the redistribution
of land or annulment of debts. The treaty accepted in Corinth took the
form of a universal peace ( koine eirene) and the Greek states that signed
this treaty in modern historiography are known as the League of Corinth.26
In the 4th century, which experienced plenty of wars and general chaos,
the koine eirene was a popular diplomatic device resorted to as many as
six times in attempts to restore political stability – though not to great
effect. But the Corinth universal peace included new solutions. Apart from
naming a hegemon, it also called into being a council ( synedrion) in which
each member state had a number of delegates proportionate to its size.
Thus all signatories to it formed a Philip-led alliance ( symmachia) at the
same time. For Philip the universal peace formula was a convenient tool to
impose Macedonian hegemony over Greece without immediately exposing
the political implications. According to the treaty signed in Corinth
hegemony was only a means of guaranteeing a universal peace demanded
by Greek public opinion. One should not interpret the League of Corinth
as a mere tool of Macedonian tyranny, though nor was it, as Philip and
Alexander’s apologists claim, a voluntary union of Greek states under the
benevolent leadership of the Macedonian descendents of Heracles.27 The
principle agreed at Corinth of not interfering in the internal affairs of other
states effectively meant a universal, be it foisted, agreement to support
pro-Macedonian oligarchies and tyrannies even though such forms of
government were by then outdated in Greece. Although not even his
enemies in Greece questioned Philip’s leadership, the free hand he was
granted to act against breaches of the treaty went far beyond the nominal
principle of equality in the koine eirene. On the other hand, the universal
peace did force Macedonia to act within the law and not at will. On more
than one occasion the synedrion acted as a mediator in disputes between
smaller Greek member states. Epigraphic evidence presents a case of the
council arbitrating in a dispute between Melos and Kimolos over three
islets – one which was eventually resolved in favour of Kimolos. This of
course does not alter the fact that the universal peace signed in 337 and
then again when Alexander succeeded his father enshrined in legal terms
26 [D.] (=Hypereides?), 17; Diod., 16.98.3; Just., 9.5.1; IG ii2 236 = Syll.3 260; Moretti, ISE 44. Heisserer 1980, pp. xxiii-xxvi; Bosworth 1988, pp. 189-193;
Blackwell 1999, pp. 38-40; Faraguna 2003, p. 101; Poddighe 2009, pp. 103-106.
27 Opposing views: Cawkwell 1969, p. 167 and Hammond 1994, pp. 158-164;
1996, pp. 22-23. Ryder 1965, p. 106; Adams 1999.
56
Chapter II
Macedonian control over Greece at the
end of Philip II’s reign and under
Alexander.28
In the autumn session of 337 the decision was also made to wage war
against the Great King under the pretext that Persia had broken the
universal peace.29 This decision officially set in motion a chain of events
leading to war with Persia, Alexander’s conquest of the Achaemenid
Empire and the start of what 2,200 years later was referred to as the
Hellenistic Epoch. This was a genuine turning point marking the start of
one of the most profound revolutions in Mediterranean civilization, though
we may assume that for those participating, the importance of these events
was not as apparent as it would be for observers in later centuries. The
resolution was passed by the synedrion of the League of Corinth at a time
when Alexander was still the heir to the throne and so the decision to wage
war on Persia actually belonged to his father. The momentous consequences
of this decision have made it the subject of great controversy among
modern historians, particularly with regard to the moment when Philip
decided to attack the powerful Persian Empire and also as to what his
objectives in this war were.
In the 4th century the Greek attitude towards Persia was quite
ambivalent. The most powerful empire that had ever existed both terrified
and fascinated the Greeks. Its sheer size, the fact that it encompassed
virtually all known lands to the east of Greece, meant that it was
frequently simply referred to as Asia as if in a sense the empire and the
continent were one and the same – a continent of whose boundaries before
Alexander’s expedition the Greeks had no idea. Its population, at the start
of the expedition an estimated 30 to 35 million people, greatly exceeded
the demographic potential of not only individual poleis or Macedonia but
even the entire Greek world. The Greeks called the ruler of Persia the
Great King or simply the King. Unlike the kings of Sparta, Macedonia or
of the Molossians in Epirus, who were all referred to by name, the Persian
monarch was a king par excellence. The way Greeks referred to the