did not fall easily then he could not afford to besiege it, as he would be
open to an attack from the Franks or the Mosulis. He had a reason for being
wary, for Gumushteldn of Aleppo had sent an urgent message to Raymond
of Tripoli, who raised a force and moved on Homs, thereby endangering
Saladin's line of supply. In addition, news reached Saladin that a relief army
was approaching from Mosul and he had no choice but to lift the siege of
Aleppo and hurry south to confront Raymond, who quickly retreated. For
the time being the threat to Aleppo had been removed. In gratitude for the
Franldsh help, Aleppo released from their prison several Christian prisoners,
among whom was Reynald of Chatillon, who would emerge as Saladin's
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nemesis. It can be fairly said that it would have been better for the fate of
the Latin Kingdom had he remained in a dungeon in Aleppo.
Emboldened by what they interpreted as a retreat, and strengthened by
the relief force from Mosul, the Aleppans now marched out to confront
Saladin. In fact the relief force which arrived from Mosul was headed not
by Saif a-Din Ghazi but by a younger brother, Izz al-Din Masud, and the
reason for that was that the two nephews of Nur al-Din, Saif a-Din Ghazi
and Imad al-Din Zengi, had turned against each other. Kamal al-Din al-
Shahrazuri had once warned Nur al-Din that the end of the house of the
Zengids would be at their hands, and it seemed that his prophecy was com-
ing true. What is perhaps less well known is that Saladin played a role in set-
ting the two brothers against each other, so as to weaken them. He even
sent some troops to help Imad al-Din Zengi^® - proof, if any was needed,
that Saladin could play the political game of chess as well as any of the other
competitors. In the meantime, on 29 March, Baalbek, where he had grown
up, fell peacefully to Saladin. Yet the news of the approaching army from
Mosul was alarming. Saladin knew that Aleppo and Mosul had made an
alliance with the Franks and he had written to the caliph complaining
against this agreement. The Mosuli-Aleppan-Franldsh alliance meant that
Saladin could not fight the Aleppan forces without fear of Raymond attack-
ing his lines of supply. It was an awkward situation, but then again Saladin
had been in awkward situations before. Short of men, he wrote urgently to
Egypt to send troops. At the same time, aware that he could not fight on
two fronts, he entered into a truce with the Franks to protect his flank - a
'deplorable act' he was quick to label it - but he felt he had no choice, as
the Aleppans and the Mosulis had forced his hand. In return for a guaran-
tee that he would not be attacked, Saladin agreed to release some Frankish
hostages. This truce strengthened Saladin's position in north Syria, while
leaving many Franks perplexed and angered - none more so than William of
Tyre, who bemoaned the truce which was:
done against our interests, for our favour was extended to a- man who ou^ht
to have been resisted with vigour lest, having become more powerful, he
should behave with greater insolence towards us; and so he dared to place his
hopes in us, although all the time he was increasing his power at our expense.
To a large extent, however, Raymond of Tripoli, who was acting as regent,
had little option but to reach an agreement with Saladin, for signs of leprosy
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SALADIN
were becoming distressingly clear in the young Baldwin IV and the priority
was to find a husband for Baldwin's sister, Sybil, who could act as regent
and in due course succeed him. But even with the truce Saladin was still out-
numbered by the forces of Mosul and Aleppo. It was a vulnerable position
to be in and the natural strategy would have been to retreat further south.
Perhaps the younger Saladin would have done so, but the experience he had
gained while vizier had emboldened him and he trusted his instincts and his
men. And so he deliberately chose to remain in a vulnerable position and
expose his army to an attack. The only conclusion that one draws from this
and especially to the Abbasid caliph, that he was the one aggressed upon
and not the aggressor. As Lyons and Jackson conclude, Saladin was delib-
erately baiting a trap and had 'outmanoeuvred his enemies strategically and
tactically so as to induce them to throw away their advantages by attacldng
him'.i"
The battle itself took place at the Horns of Hama on 13 April - if it
can be called a battle, since it was more of a rout. Saladin knew that the
Aleppans were better at posturing than fighting and were certainly no match
for his battle-hardened veterans. In his words, the enemy broke 'like glass',
and on observing Izz al-Din Masud's military manoeuvring, he smiled to
himself. 'He is either the bravest of men,' he commented wryly to his amirs,
'or else he knows nothing of war.' Careful instructions were given to his
• army to remain disciplined, for Saladin was aware that greater issues than a
military victory were at stake. He hoped that one day his present enemies
would serve under him and he needed to act accordingly. So he ordered
that a line of flight be opened for the defeated Aleppans and gave strict
instructions that they should not be pursued. In addition, no fiigitives or
wounded men were to be Idlled and any prisoners taken were to be released.
Throughout, the impression is that Saladin was totally in control of the situ-
ation and the Aleppan defeat led to a treaty, which saw them break qflf their
treaty with the Franks. In addition Saladin was ceded lands in Syria, al-
Salih's name was retained in the coinage and Friday sermons in Saladin's
domains, and the Aleppans agreed to supply men to fight the holy war. Izz
al-Din Jurdik was also released and he entered Saladin's service. It was a
favourable treaty for Saladin; he had firmly established his position in Syria
and his diplomacy had won him allies, for his army had increased tenfold.
But he had failed to take Aleppo, where al-Salih remained, out of reach, and
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7: T H E P R I Z E O F SYRIA
he had not been able to establish the Idnd of authority which Nur al-Din
had over Syria. He wrote at once to the caliph stressing his credentials for
fighting the holy war and requesting a caliphal diploma of investiture to
cover Syria, but he probably only did so as a show, for he laiew the caliph
would not take sides. Indeed he soon received robes of honour and a
diploma of investiture covering only the lands he already had. And to prove
that the caliph was not prepared to take sides, he sent similar robes to al-
Salih in Aleppo.
Apart from Aleppo, Saladin effectively controlled Syria and, as he had
done in Egypt, he now gathered his family around him. He restored Homs
not to Fakhr al-Din al-Zafarani but to Shirkuh's son. This caused anger on
Fakhr al-Din's part, who felt betrayed, and he departed from Saladin and
moved into the Mosuli camp. However, it was not the last time the two m
en
would meet. In many ways Saladin had no choice - he needed to rely on his
family as they were the base of his support and the platform for the dynasty
he wished to build, and they in return needed to be compensated. And so
Saladin also handed Hama to his maternal uncle Shihab al-Din Harimi and
appointed his nephew Taqi ul-Din as governor of Damascus, while Farrukh
Shah returned to Egypt with the Egyptian troops. As for Saladin, he chose
to return to Damascus, for he remained wary about Mosul's motives. And
he had a right to be, for news reached him that Saif al-Din of Mosul had
taken advantage of the absence of Saladin's Egyptian troops to enter into a
secret agreement with Aleppo and to move his troops to Nisibin so as to
threaten Hisn Kaifa and Mardin. Saladin immediately wrote to the caliph
to point out that Saif al-Din's actions were breaking the treaty he had
signed with Aleppo, but by the spring of 1176 Saif al-Din had crossed the
Euphrates and had made direct contact with Aleppo. Negotiations had even
commenced on how the spoils in Syria would be divided once Saladin had
been driven back to Egypt. When news of these negotiations reached
Saladin he set off at once from Damascus and by April 1176 was at Hama.
The situation was dangerous and Saladin quickly required reinforcements.
He appealed to Turan Shah, who had stood by him so decisively in Egypt,
and who was in Yemen, to join him as soon as possible. Turan Shah arrived
in Damascus by the end of April. In the meantime Saif al-Din had moved
south of Aleppo and Saladin gathered his army to confront him. The battle
was joined at Tell al-Sultan and Saif al-Din's army certainly outnumbered
that of Saladin. Saif al-Din's left: wing was commanded by Muzafifar al-Din
• 115 •
SALADIN
Keukburi, who that day fought against Saladin but who would become one
of his most famous generals.
Once again the battle was a non-event as the Mosuli troops disintegrated.
As before, Saladin was generous in triumph and allowed the scattered Mosulis
to flee without pursuit, for he was eager to win them over to his cause and
magnanimity in victory was no hardship. Of those who fled was Saif al-Din
himself, who hurriedly abandoned his tent, which was found to contain an
impressive aviary containing nightingales, pigeons and doves. When Saladin
learned of this he ordered that the birds be returned to Saif al-Din, accom-
panied by a dismissive message: 'Tell him to stay at home and play with his
birds and leave serious matters to others'. Within a month, however, Saladin
would find out that Saif al-Din still possessed some venom, for on 22 May
the Assassins struck again, when four of them succeeded in infiltrating Saladin's
most trusted bodyguards and made an attempt on his life. One of them came
so close that he struck Saladin with a Imife, slashing his cheek before being
slain. The other three were cut down immediately, but as Saladin, with
blood pouring down his face, was escorted back to his tent, panic spread
among the camp and strangers were seized. Henceforth Saladin refused to
speak to anyone he did not know and asked those whom he did not recog-
nise to be removed immediately from his presence, though not without
dispatching a messenger after them to hear and fulfil their petition.
The situation in Syria was frustrating in the extreme: military victories
'had not translated into a satisfactory political solution. As long as Aleppo
stubbornly resisted, Saladin knew he could not endure long sieges without
tarnishing his reputation. To exacerbate the frustration, al-Qadi al-Fadil
pleaded to return to Egypt, where the affairs of the country required his
assistance. His absence was felt by Saladin, who relied on him considerably.
Now in his place and as his deputy he recommended someone whose pedi-
gree was impeccable and who had already served under two of the pillars of
the Sunni Revival. Born in 1125 in Isfahan into a prestigious family, Imad
al-Din al-Isfahani entered the Nizamiyya madrasa at a young age, where he
remained studying and teaching jurisprudence for the next 15 years. In
1157, at the age of 32, he was sent to administer Wasit and Basra on behalf
of the vizier Ibn Hubayra, who was on good terms with Nur al-Din. In
1167, two years after the vizier's death, he moved to Syria, where his con-
nections served him well and he found employment with Nur al-Din. It was
also during this period that he came into frequent contact with Shirkuh and
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7: T H E P R I Z E OF SYRIA
Ayyub and began a lifelong friendship with Saladin. In fact it seems that
Imad al-Din had known Saladin's father, Ayyxxb, from an earlier period,
probably when he was serving under Ibn Hubayra. After Nur al-Din's
death, Imad al-Din moved to Mosul, but when he heard that Saladin was
marching on Damascus he rushed there. He was astute enough to under-
stand that he needed to gain favour with al-Qadi al-Fadil, who was the key
to acquiring a position of power under Saladin, and it seems that al-Fadil
was impressed with him - in particular his command of Persian. Both men
were avid readers of the spiritual architect of the Sunni Revival, al-Ghazali,
and it was al-Qadi al-Fadil who commissioned Imad al-Din to translate al-
Ghazali's Alchemy of Happiness &om Persian into Arabic. We are told that it took him four months to complete this task. What is of great interest is that
the man who introduced Imad al-Din to al-Fadil was none other than Ibn
Masai who had, during the siege of Alexandria, become a close friend of
Saladin. Al-Qadi al-Fadil would have also been impressed that Imad al-Din
was familiar with the internal affairs of the Nur al-Din court and he seems
to have helped him alleviate some financial problems and recommended
that he be appointed to work in Saladin's chancellery.
Imad al-Din quicldy established himself in the inner circles of Saladin's
entourage. In the words of Richards, 'he belonged to that circle of intimates
who stayed on after the emirs and officials had left the general audience.
This gave privileged access to the sultan's ear.'^^ It appears that Saladin
called on him day and night and to such an extent that Imad al-Din built
himself a new house adjacent to the Damascus citadel so that he could be
on call at any time; and it can be fairly said that he offered a 'genuinely
insider viewpoint'.^' Imad al-Din served both Nur al-Din and Saladin and
he certainly admired them greatly; indeed his most important work, al-Barq
al-Shami (The Syrian Lightning), which covers the period 1 1 6 6 - 9 3 and
which can be claimed to be Imad al-Din's memoirs, was written precisely
because he feared that Saladin's name would be forgotten. In many ways it
remains the best source for Saladin's life and one is struck by its impartiality
towards the two men whom he served. Imad al-Din symbolised, even more
than al-Qadi al-Fadil, the scholar/adminstrator ideal which was the aim of
the madrasas. Not only had he studied and taught at the Nizamiyya in
Baghdad, but he also served those in power. At the same time he maintained
a strong attachment to reli
gion and scholarship, which is partly reflected
in his choice of a Sufi cemetery as his burial place. Certainly reading Imad
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SALADIN
al-Din's work gives a glimpse into the world view of the clerical class and
how distinct it was from the military one. At one point he asserts the power
of his pen, equating it with Saladin's sword, and this is brought out in one
remarkable occasion when he was asked to execute a prisoner of war but
declined to do so, explaining that his calling was to the pen, not to the
sword. It was an attachment which on occasion blinded his impartiality. We
have to recall that the military class was composed largely of Kurds and
Turks, while the clerical class were Arabs and Persians, and Imad al-Din,
reflecting his clerical background, is sometimes dismissive. For example, he
criticised Qaraqush, a leading member of Saladin's military circle and the
defender of Acre, as a Turk who possessed no books, thereby betraying a
sense of proportion which was corrected by Ibn Khallikan, who wrote that
Saladin and Islam owed Qaraqush a considerable debt. Neverthless Imad al-
Din retained an objectivity that was refreshing; none more so than when he
mocked himself about how, on one occasion, he lost his nerve and withdrew
from a military expedition. He was equally a realist who understood the
realpolitik that drove both men on: 'the force of ambition and the strength
of self-interest'.^" He was also very good at reading between the lines -
and how could he not be, when he spent his career couching diplomatic
language to maximum effect.> On one occasion when Saladin was away on
campaign, Imad al-Din heard the public crier announce that the sultan had
returned safely and immediately surmised that Saladin had been de^eated,
• for few could 'spin' stories better than Imad al-Din al-Isfahani: 'They would
not be giving good news of his safety', he noted, 'unless there had been a
defeat'. It would be hard to overestimate how important both Imad al-Din
and al-Qadi al-Fadil were to Saladin, for the two men turned his chancery
into a major and highly effective instrument of propaganda.
The question that plagued Saladin was what was to be done with Aleppo.