while Saladin ruled Egypt, the loyalty he received from Alexandria never
wavered - a loyalty forged during a siege.
By July 1167 it was clear that the city could endure no flirther; food
had run out and Shirkuh's efforts to create diversion had yielded no results.
A messenger now secretly slipped out of the city canying an appeal from
Saladin to Shirkuh: you need to resolve this matter quicldy, for we cannot
endure much longer. Frustrated but unable to reprieve the siege, Shirkuh
had no choice but to enter into negotiations with Shawar, who himself was
not unwilling to listen, for he was eager that both the Syrian and the
Prankish armies depart Egypt. If the Syrians were destroyed then that would
leave the Franks in too strong a position, and that would mean solving one
problem by creating a larger one. So at the beginning of August terms were
agreed and finally the city opened its gates. Saladin was escorted out and
lodged with great honour in Amalric's camp, where he received a stream of
visitors, among whom many were Franks, eager to meet this young man
who had resisted for so long. A Christian chronicle even records that
while at the camp Saladin befriended Humphrey of Toron, who spoke
Arabic fluently, and who, out of respect for his bravery, Icnighted Saladin.
An apocryphal story of course, but even in those early years are the begin-
nings of a Western fascination with Saladin, which would slowly give birth
to the legend.
Led by drums and trumpets, Shawar made a triumphant entry into
Alexandria. In a tent he now sat, with Amalric by his side, as the leading
dignitaries of the city entered. Refusing to greet them, he did not allow
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them to sit until he was reprimanded by Amahic: 'Greet your holy men
with honour', he urged him. Shawar tlien reproached them with fury at
their disobedience and flagrant rebellion, at which point the sources say that
a scholar of the period replied, 'We will fight whoever comes under the
cross, no matter who he is'. Despite the terms of the truce, which had pro-
claimed an amnesty, revenge was in Shawar's heart and he ordered the arrest
of the leading conspirators. In this way Ibn al-Zubayr was brought to him
and was put to death. As for Ibn Masai, he went into hiding and managed
to slip away and flee to Syria and into Nur al-Din's service. In Amalric's
camp, news reached Saladin of Shawar's actions and he at once appealed to
the Idng to intervene. Noble of spirit, Amalric intervened and reproached
Shawar. He also agreed to Saladin's request that ships be provided to trans-
port the sick and wounded to Syria, for nothing could be gained from fur-
ther fighting. In this way, by September, Saladin was back in Damascus.
From historical obscurity Saladin had emerged; at Babain he had been
set a military task and had accomplished it proficiently, and in Alexandria
his resolve was put to the test and he had risen to the challenge. Perhaps he
recalled the siege that he had endured as a child in Baalbek and how his
father had retained the loyalty of the city through diplomacy - if'so, it
had been a valuable lesson. In a few brief months Saladin had achieved
more than any of his Syrian contemporaries. He had come of age and his
qualifications for command could not be questioned.^® But if Saladin could
be reasonably satisfied with his achievements in Egypt, Shirkuh was gripped
by a fury that raged inside him. For the second time he had failed to tame
Egypt; put simply, the alliance between Shawar and Amalric was too strong
to break. Nur al-Din was diplomatic and seemingly resigned: 'You have
exerted yourself twice', he informed Shirkuh, 'but have not achieved what
you sought', and to ease his failure he put him in charge of Homs. As for
Saladin, he slowly recovered from his hardship, but on one issue he was
resolved - he would never return to Egypt. Never had the lands of Syria
seem more welcoming and when, as recognition of his achievements, Nur
al-Din granted him two estates around Aleppo, he truly felt he had every-
thing he could wish for.
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Chapter 5
As lon£ us E^ypt rema-ins Muslim, I am ready to become the price of the
Muslims.
The Fatimid caliph Al-Adid
Amalric could not fail to notice how weak Egypt was and how easily it
would fall to his army. On him pressure was now put by his Imights -
in particular the Hospitallers - who had bankrupted themselves in cam-
paigns in Egypt and had reaped no reward. At the very least, they urged, let
us seize the city of Bilbais as a return on our investment. And so an invasion
of Egypt was orchestrated and it was agreed that when the caliph's treasure
was taken, Amalric would have half as booty and that the rest would be
shared according to the rules of military justice. When news reached Amalric
that Nur al-Din was distracted by events in Mosul, he understood that the
time was opportune and, in October 1168, he advanced on Egypt. Shawar,
in alarm, tried to buy him off, but to no avail, for it was his actions initially
in inviting him into Egypt that had led to these events. What occurred now
sent shock-waves throughout the land. Bilbais fell quicldy and the Franks
plundered the city without mercy; houses were burned down and both
Christian Copts and Muslims slain. But the events at Bilbais would have
severe repercussions for Amalric, for what was intended to be an ordered
conquest of Egypt had rapidly degenerated into a blood-bath. The message
sent to the population of Egypt was a chilling one, as the Egyptians watched
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SALAD I N
in horror the advance of the Latin army. Amalric then turned towards Cairo,
approaching it via the old city of Fustat. By now Shawar was desperate: he
did not possess the forces to resist, and Amalric was not interested in listen-
ing to offers. Fustat possessed no city walls and could not be defended, so
in November Shawar decided to prevent the supplies of the city falling into
the hands of the Franks by setting it on fire. Over 10,000 torches were used
and for two days the city burned as its inhabitants fled in terror: 'as though',
in the words of a contemporary writer, 'leaving their graves for the
Resurrection'. Skirting Fustat, Amalric then attacked Cairo with such force
that the city nearly fell.
Such news, of course, could not fail to reach Nur al-Din and, to his
surprise, he received a personal appeal from none other than the Fatimid
caliph, al-Adid, a wistful young man of less than 20 years. In his own hand-
writing he appealed that Egypt should not fall to Amalric, for the conse-
quences would be disastrous. He stressed how Muslim solidarity needed to
transcend sectarian differences and, in the letter, he included a lock of his
wife's hair, as a sign of his desperation. When Shawar heard of the letter he
confronted al-Adid, claiming that the young caliph was deluding himself,
for he was the one most likely to suffer from Nur al-Din's intervention. But
the palace was no longer listening to the vizier, for the cat
astrophic results
of Shawar's policy were all too apparent:' Bilbais had been devastated,
Fustat destroyed, Cairo besieged and Egypt was on the verge of a Christian
occupation. 'As long as Egypt remains Muslim, I am ready to become the
price of the Muslims' was al-Adid's response to Shawar. What was clear, as
Ehrenkreutz noted, was that the Fatimid palace establishment had become
utterly disappointed with the appalling performance of its vizier.
Whether the letter influenced Nur al-Din is unlikely, for he did not
require an appeal from an Ismaili to understand the danger that a Frankish
conquest of Egypt would pose. With remarkable speed he gathered his
army: he gave Shirkuh 200,000 dinars and allowed him to handpick 2,000
soldiers from the regiments, and offered an extra 20 dinars per regiment to
cover the costs of the campaign.^ Shirkuh used the money rapidly to hire
6,000 Turldsh cavalrymen from the Yaruquis tribe. Within one month
Shirkuh was ready to depart for Egypt. There was one problem, however -
Saladin refused to go. He had vowed not to return to Egypt and he simply
did not wish to endure another campaign. The situation was delicate, since
Shirkuh insisted that Saladin accompany him and Nur al-Din could not
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5: T H E U N L I K E L Y V I Z I E R
simply command him. Persuasion was necessary. Saladin, as a last excuse,
claimed he had no money and so Nur al-Din at once offered him horses and
money. But still Saladin refused, until finally pressure from the one person
he could not say no to - his father - persuaded him that he owed a duty to
Nur al-Din which he had to flxlfil. 'I went to Egypt as if I was going to my
grave', Saladin later recalled to Ibn Shaddad. Indeed, when the initial
request had come from Shirkuh, Saladin had retorted 'If the Kingdom of
Egypt were offered to me, I would not go'. In fact he would go, and the
Kingdom of Egypt would be offered to him. Nevertheless, Saladin's reluct-
ance is hard to explain. Clearly his refiasal to go could not have been down
to a lack of courage, for he had more than adequately proven himself in the
previous campaign. The only hint we get - and it is only a hint, which can
never be definitely resolved - is that a certain tension existed between him
and his uncle. Perhaps he had not been impressed by the way Shirkuh had
commanded the army during the second campaign, or maybe he resented
having been left to hold Alexandria. No matter, while Fustat burned and
Cairo defended itself desperately, reluctance had to be overcome. There was
no time to lose.
A formidable Syrian army now approached Egypt. Shawar, ever the
politician, sent a message offering to join forces to defeat Amalric, but
Shirkuh ignored the message: 'We have other plans', he retorted, for this
time he was determined he would not return empty-handed. Equally
alarmed was Amalric. He had not expected Nur al-Din to move so quickly,
and he had no desire to meet Shirkuh in battle. So, retreating to Bilbais, he
collected his forces, and on 2 January 1169 he returned to Jerusalem. The
road to Cairo lay open and events moved with bewildering pace; Shirkuh
entered Cairo with his army shordy after, and on 10 January he met with
the Fatimid caliph al-Adid, who bestowed on him a robe of honour which
Shirkuh showed his troops. Rumours were rife; there were reports that
Shawar was contemplating the assassination of Shirkuh but was dissuaded
from doing so by his son al-Kamil.^ One week later Shawar himself was
dead.
The brutal truth, probably agreed during the meeting between Shirkuh
and al-Adid, was that Shawar had to die. The actual events that led to his
murder appear simple. Lured into the Syrian camp on the pretext of paying
a visit to the supposedly ill Shirkuh, Shawar was, upon his arrival, over-
powered and slain by two of Nur al-Din's men, Jurdik and Bargash. There
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SALAD I N
is no mention of Saladin. This version of events contrasts sharply with that
of Ibn al-Athir, who claims that the plot against Shawar was hatched by
Saladin and Jurdik without the consent of Shirkuh. Although Ibn al-Athir's
hostility towards Saladin is well known, the same story is confirmed by
Saladin's biographer Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, who goes even further in
claiming that Shirkuh not only disapproved of Saladin's plan, but even
despatched Isa al-Hakkari to warn Shawar, a warning that was ignored.
Did Saladin play a role in Shawar's murder? There can be no conclusive
evidence either way, but if he did then it was a role which, far from being
covered up, was lauded by the historians. Ibn Shaddad - who could so eas-
ily have written Saladin out of the murder of Shawar if he had wished -
instead praised Saladin's role in the arrest of Shawar, writing that when the
conspirators approached Shawar, only Saladin was brave enough to seize
him. The fact was that everyone wanted Shawar dead. Shirkuh wanted to
clear the way for himself, and the Fatimid caliph al-Adid understood that by
Fatimid political standards ascendancy to the post of vizier by overthrowing
and lulling the former vizier was an accepted practice.® What exact roles
Shirkuh and Saladin played in the murder is not clear, but ultimately it
mattered little. After all, it is difficult to see how Shawar could have sumved
Shirkuh's entry into Cairo.
As expected, the vizierate was now offered by al-Adid to Shirkuh and he
accepted the position. Shirkuh's appointment appears paradoxical, for it
.effectively meant that he was serving a caliph who was, in his eyes, a heretic.
However, his decision to accept the position of vizier was driven less by
ideology and more by political expediency. Egypt required a vizier to
administer it and he was unwilling to allow anyone else to assume the posi-
tion. What Nur al-Din made of Shirkuh's decision was less clear; delight that
Egypt was finally conquered must have been tempered with anxiety that
Shirkuh had not consulted him. Although Shirkuh was stricdy speaking
acting as Nur al-Din's representative, it is wrong to overemphasise his sub-
ordinate position. In practical terms, when he left: Syria, he and his force can
better be seen as 'independent adventurers looking for a fortune, than as a
detachment of the Syrian army on a foreign campaign'.® Rumours spread
that Nur al-Din was unhappy by Shirkuh's assumption of the vizierate,
but then rumours always surround the actions of great men. Certainly Nur
al-Din would have preferred it if Shawar's life had been spared and he had
remained as a figurehead, but then again Shawar's duplicity was well known.
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5: T H E U N L I K E L Y V I Z I E R
Shirkuh he knew well, and he trusted him; after all, he had served him and
his father for over 30 years now. A great victory had been achieved and Nur
al-Din now ordered that the news be proclaimed throughout Syria and that
the towns be decorated accordingly. Egypt was finally his.
The death of Shirkuh and the appointment of
Saladin as vizier
Then suddenly, in March 1169, in his third month of office, Shir
kuh died.
Sudden deaths, particularly among viziers, always arouse suspicions, and
rumours of poisoning spread, but it does appear that his death was natural.
That he was a formidable character cannot be denied; he made his entrance
in history by slaying a man in Tilcrit and he left it having achieved what
many had only dreamt about. It was he, more than any of Nur al-Din's
amirs and perhaps including Nur al-Din himself, who insisted on the import-
ance of Egypt. In the face of adversity he persevered in that dogged, snarling
manner which befitted his character. Above all, he was a military man and
in so many ways unlike his brother and his nephew, lacldng above all their
diplomacy. But he championed the Sunni cause as much as they did. Of all
the ecumenical theologians and thinkers it was Shirkuh who was the first of
those among Nur al-Din who constructed a madrasa that taught both
Hanafi and Shafiite law, and though that may have been because he cared
little about the details of law, it is to his credit. Perhaps more importantly
for him was the fact the madrasa overlooked the polo grounds and one
imagines that it was there, in the open air and on horseback rather than in
the madrasa, that he most found solace and comfort. We are left with an
image of him after he became vizier bogged down in the paperwork that was
a necessary part of the position. Wliat is striking was that he remained on his
horse while he signed the documents, while grumbling to himself that he
had been reduced to the position of a scribe. He was a man of tremendous
courage^ as witnessed by one example when his army was returning to
Syria from Egypt at the end of his first campaign. In the presence of the
Franks he remained behind and was the last of his company to leave, and
when asked by one of the Franks if he was not afraid of treachery, since he
was now defenceless and could easily be captured, Shirkuh snorted and
answered that if anything should happen to him his whole army would
avenge him.^ Tempestuous and violent he may have been, but there was no
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SALAD I N
doubting that he was a soldier of genius, and few generals have been so
devotedly loved by their men.®
And suddenly, from nowhere, Saladin emerged from the shadows and